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information obtained illegally or obtained legally and then 
illegally misappropriated for personal use. Phillips & Zutz, supra 
note 93, at 86-93; Barbara Bader Aldave, Misappropriation: A 
General Theory of Liability for Trading on Nonpublic Information, 
13 Hofstra L. Rev. 101, 122 (1984). 
Under a constructive insider theory one "who knowingly 
receives nonpublic material information from an insider has a 
fiduciary duty to disclose before trading." Dirks, 463 U.S. at 
656. See Phillips & Zutz, note 93, at 93-95. 
The breach of duty under each of these theories, however, is 
not to the investing public and, therefore, each is a rather 
roundabout way of protecting the public. Under the 
misappropriation theory the wrong is to the rightful possessor of 
the information. Under the constructive insider theory the wrong 
is to the corporate shareholders. 
111. See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 484 U.S. 19 
(1987); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) ; Chiarella v . United 
States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 
462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); SEC 
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur C., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. 
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 
907 (1961). 
112. An example of "mere good fortune" is inadvertently, 
while waiting on line at the movies, overhearing a conversation 
about a particular corporation's business, and then, in reliance on 
the overheard information, buying shares of the corporation's 
stock. The corporate information on which Chiarella traded, on the 
other hand, was not obtained because of Chiarella's "mere good 
fortune." It was available to him because of his special 
relationship as an employee of the corporation's printing 
contractor. 
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CAN DEMAND NOTES REALLY 
BE DEMANDED? 
by 






ABC Bank lends $100,000 to B. Benny. B. Benny 
and delivers to the bank a negotiable 
note payable "on demand". ABC later 
demands payment. B. Benny refuses. ABC sues B. 
Benny for $100,000. B. Benny defends on the grounds 
that reasonable notice was required and not given. 
Whether a holder of a demand note can demand payment 
at any time? 
Maybe •. . . 
. A "demand note" is an instrument payable on demand and 
thos7 payable at sight or on presentation and those 
no t7me for payment is stated. 1 By its nature, and 
as reflected long accepted case law and in the u c c 
demand note entitles the holder to freely determine tlm: 
payment. In fa?t, such a note is actually due on the date 
I_Rade,, and has been suggested that its name is 
no actual prior demand is necessary to 
enforce payment. 
Questions concerning a holder's ability to require 
payment of f3 note at any time arise because of two 
apparently rules of law and because the intent 
of the not always clear. A two step analysis is 
call7d. for: (1) what is the effect of the applicable 
of the Code? and, (2) what is the intent of th e 
*Professor of Law,,Pace University, Pleasantville, New York. 
Member of & Lochner, Armonk, New York. 
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The Problem 
u.c.c. Section 1 - 203, a principle l?ng part 
of the common law of contracts, by imposing an obl1gat1on of 
good faith with respect to all by the 
Code: "Every contract or duty w1 th1n th1s Act 1mposes an 
obligation of good faith in its enforcement." 
Good faith is defined as "honesty 1n fact 1n the conduct or 
transaction concerned 11 • 4 Since negotiable are cover7d 
in Article 3 (Commercial Paper) and secur1ty agreements 1n 
Article 9 (Secured Transactions), one .could fairly that 
demand notes are subject to the requ1rement of good fa1th. 
The Official Comment to Section 1-208, however, proves 
this assumption to be incorrect.. Section 1-208,. entitled 
"Option to Accelerate at Will", 1mposes the requ1rement of 
good faith on a party, who among other things, desires to 
accelerate payment or performance "at will" or "when deems 
himself insecure." The Official Comment states: "Obv1ously, 
this section has no application. to in.struments 
very nature permit call at any t1me w1th or w1thout reason . 
(emphasis added). 
While the authors of the Code could have been more 
precise by setting forth the two rules in the body of Article 
2, the Official Comment is not unclear. The of 
good faith simply does not to 1nstruments. 
Determining whether a demand instrument ex1sts, based on the 
intent of the parties may not be so clear. 
A "pure" demand note is simple and classic and by its 
terms is due "on demand". In the absence of any inconsistent 
language, either within or without the instrument, it may be 
called at any time with or without reason. By contrast, there 
is the note which was born as a demand note, but may have been 
bastardized into something else. 
Consider a demand note which contains a provision that 
it is due on demand, but if no demand is made, .the note. is 
payable "at a certain date"; or a demand note wh1ch 
a default interest rate which is "due and payable at matur1ty, 
on demand or otherwise"; or a demand note given in 
with the execution and delivery of a loan agreement wh1ch 
contains covenants, ratios, and other requirements, the 
default of which constitutes an "event of default". 
Since a court will look to the documents as a whole to 
determine the intent of the parties, it might conclude when 
reviewing the foregoing examples that the parties did not, in 
fact intend the instrument to be payable on demand. The 
court might wonder why the parties agreed to such additional 
and unnecessary language if the note was really due on 
These "demandable" types of notes have been labelled "impure" 
demand notes and can become a lender's worst nightmare. 
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. Shaughnessy v. Mark Twain State Bank, addressed this 
1ssue and concluded that the so-called "demand note" in 
question was not entitled to be treated as one: 
"First, the words "(o]n demand, and if no demand is 
made, then on the" are printed on the form but 
according .to the s l .anguage the date 
16, 1980 1s typewr1tten 1n. Second the interest 
rate is prime plus two but after note becomes 
"due and payable (whether at maturity on demand or 
otherwise)" the interest rises to plus three 
paragraph 16 of the deed of trust 
l1sts .e1ght events which constitute default. The 
deed 1tself recites 26 paragraphs of covenant by 
The deed then states that defaults or 
fa1lure to perform the covenants shall cause the 
to due and payable regardless of 
Aga1n, we apply the court's analysis [in 
an earl1er case] to underscore the point that a 
demand note is, on issue, due. Further, 
in the security ... agreement, agreed 
that fa1lure to pay at maturity constituted default. 
Therefore, had the note been a demand note it would 
m.ature . and Shaughnessy would have been 
1mmed1ately 1n default. Likewise, with the deed of 
trust language, if this were a demand note, the note 
would not need default for it to be due and payable 
at the option of the bank. It would already have been due. 117 
Once the conclusion is reached that the instrument 
a117ged by the lender to be a demand instrument is not 
to be treate? as such, the u.c.c. requirements of 
good fa1th apply by v1rtue of u.c.c. Section 1-203. In the 
context of commercial instruments this means that "neither 
party which will have the effect of 
destroy7ng or 1n)ur1ng the right of the other party to receive 
the fru1ts of the contract". 8 This obligation to protect the 
legal expectations of a party translates, in the case of 
demand notes,into an obligation to give fair notice to the 
borrower before requiring payment. 
K:M.c. Co.,. v. Irving Trust Company/ did not directly 
deal W1th the r1ght of the lender to demand its note but did 
require "the exercise of reasonableness" and "valid 1 business 
judgment"
10 
in electing to terminate a line of credit under 
an agreement by which the loan was payable on demand. 
K.M.c., a wholesale grocer, entered into a financing 
agreement with.Irving .Trust Company ("Irving") whereby Irving 
agreed.to . prov1de a l1ne of credit, in its discretion, up to 
$3.5 m1ll1on. The loan was due on demand and was secured by 
all of K. M. C. 's accounts receivables and inventory. The 
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proceeds of all of K.M.C.'s receivables were required to be 
deposited into a "blocked account" to which only Irving had 
access. 
K.M.C. requested an advance of $800,000, which was 
available under its line. Irving, which was fully 
collateralized, refused and eventually K. M.C. was forced to 
liquidate its business. 
K.M.C., in its lawsuit against Irving alleged, among 
other things, that Irving its implied. duty of 
faith and fair dealing by term1nat1ng the l1ne w1thout not1ce. 
Irving defended by arguing that since the line was due on 
demand and that because advances were discretionary, it could 
terminate the line at any time. 
The court found for K.M.C. The jury awarded K.M.C. $7.5 
million in damages on the theory Ir;'ing breached; 
implied duty of good faith and fa1r deal1ng by .not g1v1ng 
K.M.C. notice of its intention to terminate the l1ne. 
The court noted that even though the obligation of K. M.C. 
was evidenced by a demand note (to which the of 
good faith under the. u.c.c. did not applX), pr?v1s1ons 1n the 
loan agreements ind1cated that the part1es d1d actually 
intend the instrument to be due on demand. The ex1stence of 
financial c.ovenants and events of default required that Irving 
exercise discretion, in good faith. 
The court held: 
"The record clearly established that a medium-
sized company . . . such as K.M.C. could not 
without outside financing. Thus, the l1teral 
interpretation of the financing agreement . . . as 
supplemented by the "blocked account" mechanism, 
would leave K.M.C.'s continued existence entirely 
at the whim or mercy of Irving, absent an obligation 
of good faith performance ... Logically, at such 
time as Irving might wish to curtail financing 
K.M.C., as was its right under the agreement, this 
obligation to act in good faith would require a 
Period of notice to K.M.C. to allow it a reasonable . f . . n11 opportunity to seek alternat1ve 1nanc1ng 
Avoiding the Problem 
The problem, once recognized, is subject to avoidance by 
early and thorough attention to drafting. If a pure demand 
note is intended, care should be taken not to 1nclude any 
language inconsistent with the right to demand at any time, 
for any reason, or for no reason. 
If the transaction requires a demand instrument together 
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with other; loan documents, use a pure demand instrument 
together w1th clear and specific "saving" language in another 
document stating that the note is due on demand, in all 
events, . and that any other language is to be construed 
for the lender's benefit and not in derogation 
C?f r1ght to demand without notice. Any apparently 
1ncons1stent language may be justified as serving to assure 
the continued credit-worthiness of the borrower or to provide 
borrower with notice of circumstances when the note is 





issue will never arise if you use a time instrument 
with such due dates, events of default, default 
rates and covenants, and like provisions, as you 
Related Problems 
"Dis t' d . c:e.1onary avances" language is subject to an 
analys1s s1m1lar to demand notes. Even where the language of 
the loan makes advances discretionary, the lender 
may be requ1red, by the rules of good faith and commercial 
(as in K.M.C.), to give the borrower fair 
not1ce that future advances will not be made. 
If in the loan documents require commitment 
fees or payments, for example, a court might find 
prov1s1ons 1nconsistent with the right to make 
d1scret1onary advances , and infer an obligation on the part 
of the lender to make the advances. 
To avoid this issue, consider using language in the loan 
which commit the lender to make the advances 
making . them discretionary, but make the agreement 
1n each 1nstance, to the borrower's satisfaction of 
a . of conditions (ratios, performance standards, 
negative covenants, absence of default, 
etc . ) wh1ch w1ll g1ve the lender sufficient comfort. 
The right to accelerate the entire indebtedness in the 
of default usually causes no problems. The risk lies 
w1th ti:e use of language permitting acceleration "at will" or 
when 11 1nsecure". The u.c.c., in Section 1-208, states that 
lender may accelerate at will or when it deems itself 
1nsecure only if it believes in good faith that the prospect 
of payment or performance is impaired (emphasis added). 
If the lender accelerates pursuant to an "acceleration 
at.will" clause the file should support the belief in good 
fa1th, that the loan is in jeopardy. As noted this 
U.C.C. section does not apply to demand instruments 
ther7fore, avoid the issue consider, when appropriate: 
the 1nstrument as "demand' and avoiding the use of the 
"at w1ll" language, or alternatively, using a time instrument 
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with well-defined events of default tied to performance 
standards. 
Like the "acceleration at will" language, an "insecurity" 
clause is subject to the provisions of u.c.c. Section 1-208, 
requiring the lender to believe in good faith that the 
prospect of repayment or performance is impaired .. cover 
this situation include in the loan documents a of 
"insecure" or 'set forth those acts or events which would 
render the lender insecure; for example, state that a breach 
of a covenant requiring certain financial ratios to be 
maintained renders the lender insecure. Your client's file 
should then contain information evidencing the breach and 
supporting the determination of insecurity before the loan is 
called. Better yet, do not use or rely upon the"insecurity" 
clause. Whatever would make the lender feel insecure should 
be included as an event of default, in the case of a time 
instrument: or use a pure demand instrument to which the 
u.c.c. section does not apply. 
conclusion 
The K.M.C. decision and subsequent cases12 constitute 
notice to the bar that the courts will not consider the title 
of the instrument to be determinative of the intent of the 
parties. If the instrument is a pure demand instrument and 
there exists no documentary evidence indicating otherwise 
(ratios, covenants, events of default, etc.), the courts will 
not impose an obligation of good faith. Where, however, 
notwithstanding the title of the instrument, the intent of the 
parties is clear from other related agreements, the instrument 
may be held not to be a demand but a "dema':ldable" 
instrument, and subject to the obl1gat1ons of good fa1th. 
At least one author has stated that"··· it is rarely, 
if ever appropriate to document a commercial loan transaction 
with a demand note ... ". 13 This suggestion surely deserves 
more than casual consideration. It is a common feeling by 
lenders that a demand note gives them more control over their 
money and its repayment. They feel that by being able to 
demand repayment at any time they can constantly.monit?r the 
credit-worthiness of their borrowers. Well, wh1le th1s may 
seem to make sense, consider the following: 
1. Case law (K.M. C.) tells us that the demandable 
instrument may not be subject to demand without reasonable 
notice. 
2. The same control and monitoring can be obtained by 
the use of time instruments with performance standards (tied 
to events of default) covenants, and ratios. 
3. Most importantly, as a matter of fairness and 















ever voluntarily execute and deliver a demand note which could 
have the effect, if demanded without notice of causing it 
substantial economic difficulties? ' 
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